Biosecurity and Yield Improvement Technologies Are Strategic Complements in the Fight against Food Insecurity by Cook, David C. et al.
Biosecurity and Yield Improvement Technologies Are
Strategic Complements in the Fight against Food
Insecurity
David C. Cook
1,2*, Rob W. Fraser
3, Dean R. Paini
2,4, Andrew C. Warden
4, W. Mark Lonsdale
4, Paul J. De
Barro
2,4
1Department of Agriculture and Food Western Australia, Bunbury, Western Australia, Australia, 2Cooperative Research Centre for National Plant Biosecurity, Bruce,
Australian Capital Territory, Australia, 3Department of Economics, The University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, United Kingdom, 4CSIRO Ecosystem Sciences, Canberra,
Australian Capital Territory, Australia
Abstract
The delivery of food security via continued crop yield improvement alone is not an effective food security strategy, and
must be supported by pre- and post-border biosecurity policies to guard against perverse outcomes. In the wake of the
green revolution, yield gains have been in steady decline, while post-harvest crop losses have increased as a result of
insufficiently resourced and uncoordinated efforts to control spoilage throughout global transport and storage networks.
This paper focuses on the role that biosecurity is set to play in future food security by preventing both pre- and post-harvest
losses, thereby protecting crop yield. We model biosecurity as a food security technology that may complement
conventional yield improvement policies if the gains in global farm profits are sufficient to offset the costs of
implementation and maintenance. Using phytosanitary measures that slow global spread of the Ug99 strain of wheat stem
rust as an example of pre-border biosecurity risk mitigation and combining it with post-border surveillance and invasive
alien species control efforts, we estimate global farm profitability may be improved by over US$4.5 billion per annum.
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Introduction
While there is general agreement on the increased global
demand for food to be expected in the coming decades, there is
uncertainty surrounding global agriculture’s capacity to service
this demand through an expansion in the food supply. On a global
scale, yield growth amongst major cereal crops has generally
declined since the green revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, while
the total area under cultivation has remained constant [1–3].
About one per cent (50 000 km
2) of farm land is lost annually to
the effects of degradation, desertification, urban sprawl, mining,
recreation, toxic pollution and rising sea levels [4]. In contrast, the
human population is expected to rise to 9.2 billion by 2050 from
about 6.7 billion in 2008 [5].
Despite the need to capitalise on declining yield gains to feed
these future populations, global crop losses caused by introduced
pests and diseases continue to increase around the world [6]. We
refer to these species as Invasive Alien Species (IAS), using the
term to describe introduced pathogen, pest or weed species that
have a net negative effect on social welfare as determined by
environmental, economic and social capital [7]. Without man-
agement controls, it is estimated that IAS have the potential to
inflict pre-harvest yield losses ranging from 44–54 per cent in
wheat, 64–80 per cent in rice, 58–75 per cent in maize, 73–80 per
cent in potatoes and 49–69 per cent in soybeans [8]. Even with
controls, losses average 28 per cent in wheat, 37 per cent in rice,
31 per cent in maize, 40 per cent in potatoes and 26 per cent in
soybeans [8].
To give some examples, the fungal pathogen Black Sigatoka
(Mycosphaerella fijiensis) can reduce banana yields by 50 per cent [9].
The fungal pathogen Rice Blast (Magnaporthe oryzae) has been
estimated to causes production losses sufficient to feed 60 million
people per year [9]. Rodents consume approximately 6 per cent of
the annual Indonesian rice harvest, which is sufficient to feed
Indonesia’s 240 million people for a year [10,11]. Witchweed Striga
hermonthica has invaded 20–40 million hectares of arable land in
sub-Saharan Africa and reduced crop yields by more than 20 per
cent [8,10]. Weeds in general have the potential to reduce global
wheat yields by 18–29 per cent [8].
Cereals are the most prevalent group of crops grown across the
world, and as such IAS that affect or destroy cereal yields pose a
particular threat to food security. While many definitions of this term
have been put forward (see Maxwell [12] for 32 separate
definitions), common to most are the underlying themes of food
availability; consumer access to affordable, nutritional and safe
food; resilience of the food system to disruptions; and public
confidence in that system. Collectively, cereals cultivation takes
place over 61 per cent of the total cultivated land, over a third of
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of populations worldwide [13]. Wheat is grown across the Great
Plains of the United States, the Canadian Prairie Provinces, the
Indus and the upper Ganges Valleys, along the Kazakhstan and
Russian border and southern Australia [13]. Although many
exotic species have the capacity to damage crops in these regions,
the consequences of a new wheat stem rust (Puccinia graminis)
epidemic may be catastrophic [9,14]. With the discovery in 1999
of a new race of the stem rust fungal pathogen in Uganda (known
as Ug99) capable of overcoming existing stem rust resistance, this
is a very real prospect [15].
In this paper we examine the role of both pre-border biosecurity
measures that reduce the likelihood of IAS like Ug99 crossing
national borders, and post-border policies that lead to the early
detection of border breaches and subsequent management once
they have established and spread widely. While acknowledging the
evolution of thought from the supply-oriented first generation view
of food security to a more complex third generation view [16–21],
we apply a simplistic first generation view and focus on the benefits
of investments aimed at reducing the spread and impact of IAS of
wheat (hereon referred to as ‘biosecurity’) and crop breeding
technologies that increase global wheat supply. We treat this
investment as a new food security technology and investigate its
potential for global adoption if the incentives of the top wheat-
producing countries are aligned towards the maximisation of joint
production over time.
Methods
We treat biosecurity as an investment alternative to conven-
tional yield-increasing technologies for a fictitious central planner
with a first generation view of food security. That is, provision of
food security (and prevention against food insecurity) is purely a
matter of supply management. The central planner is able to
dictate investment in food security achieving activities across a
number of different countries. Predicted investment paths across
these countries are defined as a function of expected yield and cost
changes (and hence profitability) from investing in biosecurity
relative to yield-increasing crop varieties. We make the assumption
that the central planner will choose to invest in biosecurity
measures against the threat posed by Ug99 in country i in time
step (i.e. year) t if it is expected to reduce grower losses by a greater
amount than additional costs. The dichotomous adoption variable,
at,which takes on the value of 1 if the central planner invests in
biosecurity across n countries in year t and zero otherwise, is
defined as:
at~
1i f
P n
i~1
dit§
P n
i~1
cit
0i f
P n
i~1
ditv
P n
i~1
cit
8
> > <
> > :
9
> > =
> > ;
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where dit is the total difference in predicted cost increments
induced by Ug99 between biosecurity measures and yield
improvement technologies in country i in time t, and cit is the
total cost of implementing pre- and post-border biosecurity
measures in country i in time t. We focus on the estimation of
P n
i~1
dit to determine how large
P n
i~1
cit would need to be before at
assumes a value of 0. Therefore, the nature and effectiveness of
biosecurity measures are paramount.
The current international pre-border biosecurity strategy for
addressing the threat of Ug99 includes the use of phytosanitary
measures on traded wheat and wheat products, which lower the
probability of the rust spreading via trade routes. Post-border
biosecurity measures include monitoring through intensive disease
surveillance, and rapid, sensitive and robust detection leading to
early warning and rapid incursion responses and risk mitigation
strategies [22]. These are complemented by storage hygiene,
sampling and fumigation measures that are effective against a wide
range of storage IAS.
If, as a result of these post-border measures, a Ug99 infection is
detected early enough, there may be a strong likelihood of a fast
eradication through crop removal and destruction. Hence, the
value of dit is influenced by eradication costs and probability of
success, as well as the capacity of countries to capitalise on this
eradication and prevent post-harvest losses.
If an outbreak is not detected early enough, a longer term
management strategy is required to minimise the rust’s impacts
using crop technologies and chemical treatments. For this longer
term management to be successful, the development and release of
resistant cultivars is essential to reduce vulnerability to the disease
and its further spread throughout wheat growing regions. While
mildly resistant varieties are available in the short term, the long-
term strategy involves redeveloping the Sr2-complex which
combines the slow rusting gene Sr2 with additional rust resistant
genes to achieve prolonged resistance [23,24].
Algebraically, we expressed dit as:
dit~
EitAitzPtBitTit(Amax
it {Ait)ifAitƒAerad
it
YitPtTitAitzVitAitzPtBitTit(Amax
it {Ait)ifAitwAerad
it
()
ð2Þ
where: Eit is the cost of eradication per hectare in country i in year
t; Ait is the area infected with Ug99 in country i in year t weighted
by the probability of infection and density of infection; Pt is the
world price for wheat in year t; Yit is the change in yield resulting
from replanting to lower-yielding rust resistant wheat varieties in
country i in year t; Bitis the average wheat yield in country i in year
t; Tit is the proportion of crop lost post-harvest during storage and
transport to stored grain IAS in country i in year t; Amax
it is the total
area of wheat grown in country i in year t; Aerad
it is the maximum
technically feasible area of eradication in country i in year t; and
Vit is the increase in variable cost of production per hectare
induced by Ug99 on-farm management methods in country i in
year t.
Ait contains a great deal of biological information. It is inclusive
of entry and establishment probabilities (denoted pent and pest,
respectively), and therefore represents the area predicted to be in
need of additional management effort (i.e. beyond normal farm
management activities) due to Ug99 infection in country i in year t.
A Markov chain process, described in Hinchy and Fisher [25], is
used to change pent and pest over time according to a vector of
transitional probabilities. These transitional probabilities describe
the likelihood of moving from one pest/disease state to another.
pent and pest are combined to form a probability of invasion, pi:
pi~pent|pest where 0vpiv1: ð3Þ
To describe the movement of Ug99 post-establishment in
multiple countries we use a stratified diffusion model combining
both short and long distance dispersal processes [26]. It is derived
from the reaction diffusion models originally developed by Fisher
[27] which have been shown to provide a reasonable approxima-
tion of the spread of a diverse range of organisms [28–31]. These
models assert that an invasion diffusing from a point source will
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2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ
riDij
p
in all directions, where ri describes a growth factor for
Ug99 per year in country i (assumed constant over all infected
sites) and Dij is a diffusion coefficient for an infected site j in
country i (assumed constant over time) [32–34]. Hence, we assume
that the original infection (i.e. the first of a probable series of sites,
j) takes place in a homogenous environment in country i and
expands by a diffusive process such that area infected at time t, aijt,
can be predicted by:
aijt~pi p 2t
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
riD
p
ij
   2   
~pi 4Dijprit2   
: ð4Þ
For practical purposes, an estimate ofDij can be derived from the
mean dispersal distance (  d dij) of the pathogen at an infec-
tion site, where Dij~
2   d dij
   2
pt
[35].   d dij is the site-specific average
distance (in metres) over which dispersal events leading to infec-
tion occur. By assuming Dij is constant across all sites j we
ignore demographic stochasticity and consequent non-uniform
invasion.
The density of Ug99 infection within aijt influences the control
measures required to counter the effects of infection, and thus
partially determines the value of Ait. We assume that in each site j
in country i affected, the infection density, Nijt, grows over time
period t following a logistic growth curve until the carrying
capacity of the environment, Kij, is reached:
Nijt~
KijNmin
ij erit
KijzNmin
ij (erit{1)
: ð5Þ
Here, Nmin
ij is the size of the original influx in region j of
country i and ri is the intrinsic rate of density increase in country i
(assumed to be the same as the intrinsic rate of population
increase).
In addition to aijt and Nijt, the size of Ait depends on the
number of nascent foci (see Moody and Mack [36] – these are
satellite infection sites) in year t, sit, which can take on a maximum
value of smax
i in any year. These sites result from events external to
the outbreak itself, such as weather phenomena, animal or human
behaviour, which periodically jump the expanding infection
beyond the infection front. We use a logistic equation to generate
changes in sit as an outbreak continues:
sit~
smax
i smin
i emit
smax
i zsmin
i (emit{1)
ð6Þ
where mi is the intrinsic rate of new foci generation in country i
(assumed constant over all t), and smin
i is the minimum number of
satellite sites generated in country i.
Given equations (4)–(6), we can express Ait as:
Ait~
X m
j~1
aijtNijt
   sitwhere 0ƒAitƒAmax
i : ð7Þ
The total benefit to the central planner in terms of the alleviation
of global food insecurity through biosecurity in year t, BFS
t , can be
expressed as:
BFS
t ~
X n
i~1
ditat: ð8Þ
Recall that the central planner maintains a first generation view of
food security and is motivated by policies that affect global wheat
supply.
Table 1. International wheat production statistics, labour costs and Ug99 establishment indexes by country.
Producer
Area planted to
wheat (ha)
a
Mass of grain
produced (MT)
a
Average yield
(T/ha)
a
Value produced
(US$’000,000)
a
Labour rate
(US$/hr)
b
Ug99 establishment
index
c
China 24,210,075 114,950,296 4.75 17,395 5.00 0.134360
India 28,400,000 78,570,200 2.77 11,614 4.00 0.134360
United States of America 20,181,081 68,016,100 3.37 8,775 26.35 0.024677
Russian Federation 26,632,900 63,765,140 2.39 5,738 4.91 0.019464
Canada 9,539,000 28,611,100 3.00 3,529 29.20 0.024677
France 5,146,600 39,001,700 7.58 4,141 30.93 0.024677
Pakistan 9,046,000 20,958,800 2.32 3,040 4.34 0.181200
Australia 13,507,000 21,420,177 1.59 2,308 35.00 0.134360
Ukraine 6,752,900 25,885,400 3.83 1,795 4.01 0.002024
Turkey 8,026,898 17,782,000 2.22 2,660 12.35 0.113270
Germany 3,226,036 25,988,565 8.06 2,067 35.00 0.024677
United Kingdom 1,814,000 17,227,000 9.50 1,273 39.49 0.024677
Kazakhstan 14,329,400 12,538,200 0.87 1,358 2.52 0.000267
Argentina 4,334,780 8,508,156 1.96 2,034 16.03 0.134360
Egypt 1,321,751 7,977,051 6.04 992 5.00 0.120550
aFAO [46];
bBased on hourly wages (US$) for rural workers from U.S. Department of State [47];
cDerived from Paini et al. [37].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026084.t001
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P n
i~1
dit using multiple Ug99
spread scenarios for the top 15 wheat producing countries of the
world (i.e. n~15) over a 30 year period (see Table 1). Where there
is uncertainty surrounding parameter values, they are specified
within the model as distributions and a Latin hypercube sampling
algorithm used to sample from each distribution. In each of 10 000
model iterations one value is sampled from the cumulative
distribution function so that sampled parameter values are
weighted according to their probability of occurrence. The model
calculations are then performed using this set of parameters.
Table 1 provides wheat production information for each
country used in the analysis and approximate labour costs (used
below in forming estimates of eradication and control costs). It also
contains country-specific Ug99 establishment likelihood indexes
derived from Self Organising Map (SOM) analysis, which is a type
of artificial neural network. This technique uses worldwide species
associations to determine which species have the highest likelihood
of establishing in a particular region. Paini et al. [37] performed
a SOM analysis on the worldwide distribution of 131 plant
pathogens, including the Ug99 race of P. graminis. The index values
produced for each country are used as a proxy for establishment
probabilities.
A list of all the model parameter distributions appears in
Table 2. Note that i, j and t subscripts are omitted since, with
the exception of p
ent and increased chemical cost, parameter
specification does not change over spatial or temporal ranges.
Table notes provide details where a spatial variation is assumed.
Results
The present value of average benefits accruing from pre-border,
border and post-border biosecurity activities specifically targeted
at Ug99 is estimated by the model to average US$4.5 billion per
Table 2. Parameter estimates.
Parameters With Biosecurity Measures Without Biosecurity Measures
Probability of entry, p
ent.
a Uniform(1.0610
26, 1.0610
23) Uniform(0.3,0.7)
Probability of establishment, p
est.
b 2.6610
24 to 1.3610
21 2.6610
24 to 1.3610
21
Detection probability. Binomial(1.0, 0.5) Binomial(1.0,0.3)
Probability of successful eradication in a single time step given an infected
area, A, and a maximum area considered for eradication, A
erad (see below). Binomial 1,
A
Aerad
  
Binomial 1,
A
Aerad
  
Population diffusion coefficient, D (m
2/yr).
a,c Pert(0,2.5610
3,5 . 0 610
3) Pert(0,2.5610
3,5.0610
3)
Minimum area infected immediately upon entry, A
min (m
2). 1.0610
3 1.0610
3
Maximum area infected, A
max (m
2).
d 1.8610
12 1.8610
12
Intrinsic rate of infection and density increase, r(yr
21).
a Pert(1.0,1.25,1.5) Pert(1.0,1.25,1.5)
Minimum infection density, N
min (#/m
2). 1.0610
24 1.0610
24
Maximum infection density, K (#/m
2).
a Pert(100,550,1000) Pert(100,550,1000)
Minimum number of satellite sites generated in a single time step, S
min (#). 1 1
Maximum number of satellite sites generated in a single time step, S
max (#).
a Pert(70,85,100) Pert(70,85,100)
Intrinsic rate of new foci generation per unit area of infection, m (#/m
2).
a,c Pert(1.0610
26,3.0610
26,5.0610
26) Pert(1.0610
26,3.0610
26,5.0610
26)
Discount rate (%). Discretef(5,6,7,8,9)(1,1,1,1,1)g Discretef(5,6,7,8,9)(1,1,1,1,1)g
Supply elasticity.
e Pert(0.2,0.3,0.4) Pert(0.2,0.3,0.4)
Demand elasticity.
e Pert(-0.2,-0.3,-0.4) Pert(-0.2,-0.3,-0.4)
World wheat price in the first time step (US$/T).
d,f Uniform(155,275) Uniform(155,275)
Average yield, B (T/ha).
d 0.87 to 9.50 0.87 to 9.50
Maximum area considered for eradication (ha). 10 000 10 000
Increased chemical cost (US$/ha).
a 40 40
Increased application costs (US$/ha).
g 2.50 to 39.50 2.50 to 39.50
Cost of eradication, E (US$/ha).
h Pert(5.0610
3,1.0610
4,1.5610
4) Pert(5.0610
3,1.0610
4,1.5610
4)
Yield reduction from adoption of resistant varieties, Y (%). Pert(5,10,15) Pert(5,10,15)
Post-harvest loss (%).
i Pert(21,30,39) Pert(30,35,40)
aSpecified with reference to Cook [48] and Waage et al. [49] using distributions defined in Biosecurity Australia [50];
bSee country-specific Ug99 establishment indexes in Table 1 derived from Paini et al. [37] and interpreted here as establishment probabilities;
cDerived from Sapoukhina et al. [51];
dFAO [46]. Note 1ha = 10 000 m
2 ;
eSpecified with reference to FAPRI [52];
fInternational Monetary Fund [53];
gBased on time taken for crop removal (see
h, below) and hourly wages (US$) for rural workers from U.S. Department of State [47] provided in Table 1;
hAssumes zero compensation following crop destruction, and transport, disposal and chemical costs amounting to US$10,800 per hectare. This is inclusive of labour (see
Table 1), machinery ($100/hr at approximately 20 minutes per hectare depending on yield, soil, terrain, etc.), truck hire ($75/hr), incendiaries ($6/ha for green waste) and
creation of a circular chemical buffer zone approximately 10 hectares in diameter around previously infected sites. Chemical used is assumed to be Folicur 430 (or
equivalent, e.g. Impact 250, Tilt 250 or Triad 125) applied at a rate of 145–290 mL/ha, costing $20–40/ha and taking 6 minutes per hectare to apply);
iEstimate without biosecurity measures derived from Oerke and Dehne [6] and Oerke [8], while the with biosecurity measures estimate implies an arbitrary reduction in
post-harvest losses of Pert(1%, 5%, 9%).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026084.t002
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assessment (i.e.
P n
i~1
dit~$4:5|109). Recall from equations (1)
and (8), this represents the threshold level of
P n
i~1
cit beyond which
the central planner will choose not to invest in pre- and post-
border biosecurity as an alternative to a traditional yield-oriented
food security strategy (i.e. at~0). The standard deviation of the
distribution of average annual biosecurity benefits is US$2.8
billion and skewness 1.4 (i.e. the distribution is skewed right such
that the right tail is long compared to the left tail).
Given current average wheat yields, our estimated value of
P n
i~1
dit is equivalent to an annual increase in the global wheat
harvest volume of 46.8 million tonnes per year. To achieve an
equivalent supply increase through crop breeding average yields
would need to increase by approximately 7 per cent per year over
the same period, which exceeds all gains achieved from the past
forty years of crop breeding and engineering. Production data
suggests that wheat yield growth in the developed world has
averaged just over 1 per cent per annum since 1965 [38–40], while
less developed production regions have experienced 2–3 per cent
annual yield improvements since 1979 [38,41,42]. This amounts
to an additional 4–25 million tonnes of wheat produced annually
at an estimated value of US$2–6 billion [38–40].
Over a 30-year period, the mean benefit of pre- and post-border
biosecurity predicted by the model is US$136.4 billion, but the
uncertainty in projecting this far into the future is reflected in a
standard deviation of US$86.3 billion. The variability of results
predicted over time is illustrated in Figure 1 where the mean
cumulative benefit predicted by the model is plotted 6 1 standard
deviation and 5 per cent and 95 per cent confidence bounds.
If we separate our estimate of
P n
i~1
dit into its pre- and post-
border biosecurity components, we find that the largest returns to
investment occur through post-border biosecurity. This is shown
in Table 3, which provides the mean and standard deviation of
predicted annual benefits with pre- and post-border measures, and
combined. While pre-border biosecurity benefits are equivalent to
a 1 per cent increase in average wheat yields (or an additional 7.6
million tonnes harvested per annum), far greater gains are possible
through post-border biosecurity measures. While there is a large
amount of uncertainty surrounding each of these estimates,
indicated by large standard deviations, particularly with respect
to the combined total benefit, the effects of post-border measures
dominate those of pre-border biosecurity measures.
Given the uncertainty surrounding many of the parameters used
to describe the invasion process, the sensitivity of the change
in expected biosecurity benefits related to Ug99 to the key
assumptions of the model was tested. Parameters were sampled
from a uniform distribution with a maximum (minimum) of +50
per cent (250 per cent) of the original values entered in to the
model using Monte Carlo simulation. The Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficients relating the sampled model parameter
values and the change in
P n
i~1
dit were then calculated. The results
are presented in Figure 2.
The sensitivity tests indicate that the model is highly sensitive to
changes in three of the 24 parameters listed in Table 2 (18 of
which are shown in Figure 2). These parameters and their
correlation with predicted
P n
i~1
dit are the reduction in post-harvest
loss (0.677), the discount rate (20.367) and the world wheat price
in the first time step (0.327). While post harvest losses can be
strongly influenced by the biosecurity policies of wheat producing
countries, the other sensitive parameters cannot be manipulated
by policy makers.
Figure 1. Cumulative benefit of biosecurity measures to mitigate the spread of Ug99 throughout prominent wheat production
areas of the world over time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026084.g001
Table 3. Annual pre-border, post-border and combined
biosecurity benefits.
Pre-Border
(US$ billion)
Post-Border
(US$ billion)
Combined
(US$ billion)
Mean 0.7 4.2 4.5
St. Dev. 0.7 2.2 2.9
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026084.t003
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In terms of pre-border biosecurity, our analysis predicts the
spread of just one of thousands of IAS capable of reducing wheat
supplies worldwide. Moreover, wheat is only one commodity of
many relied on for sustenance by human populations, albeit an
important one. Future research is needed to supplement our
results with similar impact assessments for diseases such as the
aforementioned Black Sigatoka (M. fijiensis) and Rice Blast (M.
oryzae) examples. Consideration of how pest and disease impacts
might change under climate change scenarios is also needed in
which particular attention is paid to the possible effects of
intensification and climate tolerance in crop varieties on future
pest and disease fitness.
Despite the relative simplicity of the analysis, our results are
indicative of the potentially huge benefits of investing in pre-
border biosecurity. Ug99 is currently absent from the 15 countries
used in our model, and we have used conservative estimates of the
probabilities of arrival and establishment in each over time.
However, in the absence of any post-border biosecurity, the
estimated benefits of pre-border biosecurity measures that lower
the probability of Ug99 spreading throughout the world’s major
wheat growing regions exceeds $US0.7 billion per annum.
Although often overlooked in the context of food security, our
results clearly demonstrate the significant effect post-harvest losses
exert on the global food supply. While there are few dramatic steps
that can be taken to eliminate these losses, the benefits of even
subtle changes could be extremely large when amplified globally.
If wheat losses in storage and in transit were reduced by 5 per cent,
we estimate this would generate global benefits in excess of
US$135 billion over a 30 year period.
But the notion of protecting produce after it has been harvested
and before it reaches a market has often been ignored as means of
reducing food insecurity despite huge food losses. It has been
estimated that almost 30 per cent of spoilage occurs post-harvest
[6,8]. In some countries, post-harvest crop losses to vertebrate IAS
can exceed 50 per cent when conditions are favourable [10]. Lucia
and Assennato [43] and Neethirajan et al. [44] estimate that 10–
15 per cent loss of stored grains in India is common. Across the
entire Asian continent, rats alone consume approximately 6 per
cent of the annual rice harvest [10].
Given the extent of these losses and the sensitivity of our results
to post-harvest loss, we would expect a high return on investment
in technologies that reduce post-harvest losses. However, public
investment in research and development activities has been in
decline over the past 30 years. In Australia, for example, a country
highly dependent on its agricultural sector for food sufficiency
(although decreasingly so), total public expenditure on agricultural
R&D has grown from A$115 million in 1953 to almost A$730
million in 2003, but virtually all of this growth occurred prior to
1970. As a percentage of total R&D expenditure, agricultural
R&D expenditure has decreased from 20 per cent in 1982 to 8 per
cent in 2003. If this trend continues, the implications may be
severe in terms of technological innovation in agricultural storage
and transport networks.
It is also interesting to speculate as to the probable increase in
movement of IAS around the world as food trade networks become
increasinglyinterconnected.Ifthe rateofIASincursionsisa positive
functionof trade volume, therateofincursionsissetto increase with
the growth of global trade markets [45]. This is a particular concern
given the emphasis third generation food security policies place on
diversity in supply networks (see Barrett [21]). The damage caused
by these introductions threatens to detract from improvements in
futurefood securityunlessIASpreventionandinterceptionmethods
can be dramatically improved. Without stimuli to promote
biosecurity investments across food supply chains, it is difficult to
see this happening any time soon.
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